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I. LrRODUCTION
Certain scholars offer a new approach to interpreting American
violence. Their point is that America's enormous amount of violence
has been, in reality, mainly southern violence-that is, if the southern contribution, especially homicide, is removed from the national
statistics on violence, American violence narrows to the relatively
low levels of such comparable countries as Canada and Australia.'
* Beekman Professor of Northwest and Pacific History, University of Oregon. B.A., Reed
College, 1952; A.M., Harvard University, 1955; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1959.
1.

E.g., R. GAsm., CurunTA. REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 116 (1975); J. Reed, Below

the Smith and Wesson Line: Reflections on Southern Violence 2 (Apr. 21, 1977) (unpublished
paper delivered at the University of Alabama in Birmingham as part of the Hugo L. Black
Symposium in History, "Violence in the South"). For a careful discussion of American violence in worldwide comparative perspective that draws upon two studies, one by Ted Robert
Gurr and the other by Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend and Betty A. Nesvold, see
Graham & Gurr, Conclusion, in THE

HISTORY or VIoLENcE

INAMERICA 798-801 (H. Graham &

T. Gurr eds. 1969). Although these authorities make important qualifications, the point
remains that from the 1940's through the 1960's America was one of the most violent nations
in the world and was the most violent among its peer group of Canada, Australia, and the
modern democracies of Northern and Western Europe. Comparable scholarly studies have
not been made for the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, but if such studies were made,
the pattern of American leadership probably would be the same. For a worldwide comparative
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Raymond D. Gastil has rated all the contiguous forty-eight
states in terms of an "index of southernness," providing six categories of states according to most or least southern in terms of the
presence of people of southern origin and the existence of southern
cultural traits. 2 In Gastil's classification the two most-southern categories of states with their Deep South nucleus are counterpointed
by a category at the opposite end of the spectrum, the ten leastsouthern states-the six New England states plus Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the Dakotas. In the middle of Gastil's categories are
states that have significant quotients of southernness. With regard
to the crucial factor of homicide, Gastil found that "state homicide
rates grade into one another in rough approximation to the extent
to which Southerners have moved into mixed [North-South]
states." Gastil also notes that "[w]hile differences in standard
demographic or economic variables . . . account for a good deal of

the variance among sections of the country in murder rates, there
is a significant remainder that may be related to 'Southernness'
alone."' In recent years it has been fashionable to speak of the
Americanization of the South,5 but Gastil, and also sociologist John
Shelton Reed, imply that, at least with regard to violence, there has
been a southernization of America and that this trend has been
basic to America's traditionally high homicide rate. The works of
Gastil and Reed raise the possibility that southern violence has not
been merely an age-old regional problem of the South, but a national nemesis as well.
The provocative Gastil-Reed hypothesis is most persuasive
with regard to personal violence. If we grant this point that the
homicide rate, state-by-state, tends to reflect the index of southernness, then it is all the more important to consider, historically and
legally, the salient fact that for at least a century the South has been
the national leader in homicide. Statistical compilations on this
score go back a hundred years, and from then until the present, the
pattern has been unvarying: the South has been the most murderous section in the country. As early as 1878, the South's homicide
rate was far in the lead,' and by 1920-1924 the pattern had not
perspective documenting American leadership in homicide alone, see H. BREARLEY, HOMIcIDE
INTHE UNITED STATES 27-28 (1932) (dealing mainly with the 1920's).
2. R. GASTIL, supra note 1, at 109.

3. Id.
4. Id. at 116 (emphasis added). A critique of Gastil's thesis is found in Loftin & Hill,
Regional Subculture and Homicide: An Examinationof the Gastil-Hackney Thesis, 39 AM.
Soc. REV. 714 (1974).
5. See, e.g., J. EGERTON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF DIXIE (1974).
6. See H. REDFIELD, HOMICIDE, NORTH AND Sour: BEING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF CRIME
AGAINST THE PERSON mNSEVERAL PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES 9-14 (1880).
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changed.7 In that five-year period the seven most homicidal states
were southern, and the South as a whole was two and one-half times
as homicidal as the rest of the nation.$ As recently as 1969 the
figures revealed that of the top fifteen most homicidal states of the
contiguous forty-eight, all but three were southern or border states.'
In 1973 all the ex-Confederate states but two-Virginia and Arkansas-exceeded the national rate for murder."o In 1976, according to
Federal Bureau of Investigation figures, the six states leading America in murder and non-negligent manslaughter were all southern."

II.

SoUrHERN VIOLENCE
Why has the South been so violent? Leading authorities are in
agreement as to the general causes of southern violence. One
scholar's research disclosed the large number of killings in the South
that arose from personal difficulties-these were homicides to preserve "self-respect" or to vindicate personal honor." This finding by
H. C. Brearley, the Clemson University sociologist, supports the
conclusions of the most reflective authorities on the cultural and
historical origins of southern mayhem and extremism. John Hope
Franklin in his study of the "militant South" from 1800 to 1861
concluded that "[v]iolence was inextricably woven into the most
fundamental aspects of life in the South and constituted an important phase of the total experience of its people." 3 The violenceprone "man of the South was the product of his experiences as a
frontiersman, Indian fighter, slaveholder, self-sufficient yeoman,
poor white, and Negro. He gladly fought, even if only to preserve his
THE CAUSES OF

7. See Brearley, The Pattern of Violence, in CurTm IN THE Sotrra 678 (W. Couch ed.
1934).
8. Id.
9. See H. LUNDSGAARDE, MURDER IN SPACE CrrY: A CULTUuRAL ANALYSIS OF HOUSTON
HOMICIDE PATrERNS 217-18 (1977).
10. See C. DEGLER, PLACE OVER TME 25 (1977).
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRmE INTHE UNITED STATES 1976, at 44-53 (FBI Uniform
Crime Reports 1977). The six states were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas,
and South Carolina. Other studies showing southern leadership in homicide include R.
GAsTr, supra note 1, at 108 (for 1964-1965); C. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW Sourn 15859 (1951) (for 1890); Lottier, Distributionof CriminalOffenses in Sectional Regions, 29 J. Am.
INST. Cam. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329 (1938) (for 1934-1935). One should note, however, that
although the South has been the most homicidal section of the nation, at least in recent times,
it has not been, on the whole, the most criminal part of the United States. The studies by
Lottier, supra, and Reed, supra note 1, support Sheldon Hackney's finding that in the South,
compared to the North, "there are high rates of homicide and assault, moderate rates of crime
against property, and low rates of suicide." Hackney, Southern Violence, in THE HISTORY OF
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 507.
12. Brearley, supra note 7, at 684-85.
13. J. FRANKLIN, THE MIArrNer SoUrH: 1800-1861, at 12-13 (1964).
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reputation as a fighter."" The late Charles S. Sydnor made an even
more subtle point when he discussed "The Southerner and the
Laws""5 in his presidential address to the Southern Historical Association in 1939.16 Sydnor's message was that, although by the ordinary meaning of the term, southerners were indeed a very lawless
people, upon closer consideration this was not really true. Indeed,
Sydnor underscored the broad view of law held by southerners. They
did not restrict their conception of the law to the statutes and the
decisions of the courts. Instead, they maintained a lawful reverence
not only for the Constitution but also for the Bible and unwritten
laws, especially those concerning matters of personal honor, the
family, and the institution of slavery. Thus, southerners might act
extralegally, but not, by their lights, illegally.17
In contrast to the situation in the "commercial, industrial, and
urban areas" of the North, "ruralness, slavery, [and] the plantation system" in the South nurtured "a strong unwritten code [that]
operated . . . to restrict the power of ordinary law and to enlarge

the area of life in which" men acted "without reference to legal
guidance" of the strict sort." Giving us an insight that is supported
by the legal history research of Michael S. Hindus," Sydnor wrote
that the planter of the Old South
simply went through life under the assumption that a relatively large number
of his deeds had to be performed out past the margin of written law in what
might be called a state of nature. To northern eyes this condition looked like
an approach to anarchy and chaos; but planters thought their actions were no
more lawless than the operation of a court of equity?2

The power of the unwritten law to motivate the behavior of southerners persisted well into the twentieth century, 21 and for our own
time, Reed has analyzed recent opinion polls to show that, in the
realm of individual behavior, southerners retain a value system and
behavioral patterns that make them more tolerant of violence and
"the use of force" than other Americans. 2 2
Personal violence-with its ultimate expression in homi14. Id. at 13. See also Vandiver, The Southerneras Extremist, in THE IDEA OF THE SouTH
12 (F. Vandiver ed. 1964).
15. Sydnor, The Southernerand the Laws, in THE PuRsuIT OF SOUTHERN HisTORY 62 (G.

Tindall ed. 1964).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 65.
19. Hindus, The Contours of Crime and Justice in Massachusettsand South Carolina,
1767-1878, 21 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 237 (1977).
20. Sydnor, supra note 15, at 68.
21. See Brearley, supranote 7, at 684.
22. J. REED, THE ENDURING SourH 45-56 (1972). See also J. Reed, supra note 1, at 8-10.
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cide-therefore has been culturally sanctioned in the South longer
and in greater magnitude than any other part of our country. Yet,
to say that the cultural context has historically made southerners
more homicidal than other Americans should not divert us from a
point made long ago that despite the presence of an abnormally
large number of manslayers, "law-abiding, peaceably-disposed citizens are very largely in the majority" in the South." Thus, a major
theme is the confrontation between the law-abiding, peaceably disposed, on the one hand, and the homicidal, on the other. This confrontation continues in the contemporary South, but it came most
starkly to the forefront in the late nineteenth century, the period
when New South idealism about a more civil society was contradicted, tragically, by the persistence of the antebellum "tradition
of violence."2 "If anything," wrote C. Vann Woodward, violence
was "more characteristic of the new society than of the old," and
in place of the code duello of the pre-Civil War time, "gunplay,
knifing, manslaughter, and murder were the bloody accompaniments of the march of Progress" of the New South in the years after
Reconstruction?2
The period from the 1870's through the 1890's was the most
violent in our national history, and it was also the period when the
South's historic affliction of violence was at its highest-the time
when lynchings reached their peak and when homicide also was very
widespread. The South's post-Civil War crimson tide of killing was
brought to the attention of both the region and the nation in an
impassioned book, Homicide, North and South: Being a Comparative View of Crime Against the Person in Several Partsof the United
States,26 appearing in 1880 under the authorship of Horace V. Redfield. A newspaper correspondent who had spent much time in the
South, Redfield was a friendly critic who believed that there was
"more good than evil in the South," but who had been struck "with
the frequency of homicide" in Dixie. At the outset, Redfield offered
his shocking but carefully made estimate that between the end of
the Civil War and 1880 there had been 40,000 homicides in the
southern states." The main purpose of his book was to supply a
statistical comparison of homicide in the North and the South, but
he was not oblivious to a cross-national perspective. Consequently,
he found that in certain rural regions of the North the homicide rate
23. H. REDFIELD, supra note 6, at 206.
24.

C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 158.

25. Id.
26.

H. REDFIELD, supra note 6.

27. Id. at 3-5.
28. Id. at 11.
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was comparable to the impressively low rate of less than one killing
per hundred thousand inhabitants in England and Wales, while in
the South the homicide rate was four to fifteen times higher than
anywhere else in the civilized world.2
Redfield found the root of the problem in the resolution of personal difficulties with deadly weapons and in the street fights and
barroom affrays that occurred forty times more often in the South
than in, for example, New England."0 The problem of the ubiquitous
killing encounters was compounded and exacerbated by the equally
widespread phenomenon of unpunished murder, a feature that was
so deeply embedded in southern society as to be in reality a system
supported by all classes, men of family, position, and standing, and
even the church. One authority cited by Redfield noted that "time
and time again [he had] seen the verdict of justifiable homicide
brought in in cases [that in] New England and the North, would
be considered cold-blooded murder." 31 "The law," he concluded, "is
recognized only as a shield to protect [the killer] from the consequences of the law." 32 With self-defense as a spurious but all powerful plea to complacent jurymen, the entire system was too often
little more than "a cloak for murder."" Under such conditions murders averaged one a day in the state of Mississippi, and throughout
the region men who walked the streets and boasted "of having killed
their man" were found "in every town and neighborhood."3 1
The following scenario of the unpunished murderer of the South
was typical:
The murderer "kills a man in a street-fight" or a bar-room brawl.
He is arrested.
The "examining magistrate fixes his bail usually from $100 to $3,000,
which he promptly gives."
"The case is continued through a few terms of court."
"The grass grows over the grave of the slain. It is watered by the tears of
the widow and the orphans."
"Public interest dies out, [and] some of the witnesses move off."
"There are a few more continuances to give other witnesses a chance to
move around and see the country."
The defense witness who can testify, falsely, to having heard the deceased
"make threats" to the killer "never moves away. He is not of a roving mind."
"Finally a trial is reached. Major A. and Colonel B. and General C. appear
for the defendant. A jury is selected. If there is a murderer or two, or half dozen
on it, all the better. There is a 'fellow-feeling,' especially in the region of the
neck."
29.

Id. at 4, 9-10.

30. Id. at 17.
31.

Id. at 57-58.

32. Id. at 61.
33. Id. at 122.
34. Id. at 162-63.
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"The witnesses are examined. It is proved that the deceased was seen to
'reach around behind him as if to draw a pistol,' or that he started home
presumably to get his shot-gun. The defendant had his with him. The case is
argued. Authorities are cited. The defendant is acquitted."-

Redfield's bitter sketch of unpunished murder was not fanciful, but
rather, a quite accurate reflection of the post-Civil War state of
southern justice badly skewed toward the condition of legalized
murder. Redfield's scenario and, in general, his critique of the deficiencies of southern justice were sound enough. They reflected real
problems that, at least in some cases, jurists like Chief Justice
George Washington Stone of Alabama strove mightily to combat
from the bench. 6
The illegitimate claim of self-defense to justify or excuse a homicide and the community's acceptance of the killer were not the only
problems. Another major problem was the common practice of
carrying concealed weapons, especially guns. In a majority of southern states there were laws against this practice, but these laws too
often were a dead letter, unobserved and unenforced, despite the
efforts of certain judges to support them." Well-meaning judicial
actions were often nullified by the many examples of men at the
very highest level of society who persisted in carrying concealed
firearms in defiance of the requirements, legal or otherwise, of prudent behavior. Thus, Redfield wrote of a Governor of Tennessee
who, while speaking heatedly against his opponent from an election
campaign platform, startled the crowd when he drew from his
pocket, but did not use, a hidden pistol. There also was the example
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Louisiana whose
concealed pistol dropped from his pocket and fired accidentally as
it hit the floor of the legislative chamber."
The South's historic subculture of violence and community tolerance of killing in personal disputes were powerful factors of inertia
in preserving the homicidal tendency of the section. These factors
were very difficult for the system of formal law to overcome, but in
dealing with such matters as the trial plea of self-defense to excuse
a homicide and the custom of carrying concealed weapons, Redfield's treatment of southern homicide touched upon elements that
were well within the scope of the formal law composed of the statutes, the penal codes, the courts, the juries, the judges, and their
opinions.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 163.
For a discussion of Justice Stone, see Parts IV & V infra.
H. REDFIELD, supra note 6, at 194-95.
Id. at 195.
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OF THE DocTRINES OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
DUTY To RETREAT

Going back at least to the thirteenth century, English common
law "was extremely severe as to homicide." 3 ' "[T]he right to kill
in self-defense was slowly established, and is a doctrine of modem
rather than of medieval law."" Thus, Blackstone's presumption
against the accused killer who claimed self-defense stemmed not
only from the common law tradition but also from Blackstone's fear
that "the right to defend might be mistaken as the right to kill.""
But under the new American conditions, especially the boisterous life of the frontier and the militant society of the antebellum
South, the traditional English common law restraints on homicide
began to give way. A legal case in point was Graingerv. State.4 2 This
1830 Tennessee case "became notorious . . . [for having] intro-

duced new doctrines into the law of homicide in self-defense,
whereby a man . . . could justify himself in killing [an] unarmed

assailant with a deadly weapon."" The Graingeropinion was written by Judge John Catron of the Tennessee Supreme Court, better
known later as Taney's colleague on the United States Supreme
Court. Catron's opinion reversed Grainger's lower court capital conviction. For half a century thereafter, careless wording in the opinion by Catron became the basis for a gigantic loophole through
which a guilty killer could be acquitted by pleading self-defense.
The wholesale abuse of the case found its pretext in Judge Catron's
failure to insert after the words "thought himself so"" the qualifying
phrase "upon sufficient grounds." Judge Catron's unmodified words
allowed future defendants, by citing Grainger as precedent, to esR. MORELAND, THE LAw or HOMICIDE 259-61 (1952).
40. Beale, Retreat from a MurderousAssault, 16 HAnv. L. Ray. 567, 567 (1903).
41. F. BAUM & J. BAUM, LAw or SELF-DEFENSE 6 (1970).
42. 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 459 (1830). This was the "timid hunter" case in which the hunter,
Grainger, "a timid, cowardly man," was drawn into a quarrel with the bully, Broach. In his
review of the facts, Judge Catron made much of Grainger's timidity and cowardice. In fear
of his life, Grainger fled from the pursuing Broach until he reached the wall of a cabin and
could flee no further. He shot and killed the unarmed Broach as the latter advanced. Grainger
had obeyed the traditional common law duty to retreat before taking life in self-defense, the
court concluded. The legal significance of the case stems from the wording of Catron's decision. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
43. Ingersoll, John Catron, in 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERs 241, 260 (W. Lewis ed. 19081909).
44. Judge Catron's complete thought appears as follows:
If the jury had believed that Grainger was in danger of great bodily harm from Broach,
or thought himself so, then the killing would have been in self defence [sic]. But if he
thought Broach intended to commit a battery upon him, less violent, to prevent which
he killed Broach, it was manslaughter.
13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) at 462.
39.
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tablish self-defense by proving only the killer's fearful state of mind,
without also proving the actual grounds to support this fear. Thus,
Dean Ingersoll observed that until about 1880 throughout the South
and Southwest, the gallows were cheated of their rightful victims
"hundreds of times."4 5
With an impact similar to the Graingercase, but narrower in
geographical scope, the 1856 Mississippi case of Ex parte Wray" also
gave a big edge to the defense in homicide cases. A personal dispute
and combat" between the killer, Jacob K. Wray, and his victim
resulted in the trial of Wray for murder. Wray, clearly guilty,
claimed self-defense to excuse his homicide, an argument that ultimately was accepted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The innovative quality of the supreme court's decision made it important,
for the court in upholding Wray's innocence gave the mantle of
legality to killing in a personal and mutual rencontre."5 The Mississippi court in effect gave judicial approval to street-fight killing.
The Wray court blatantly expanded the common law doctrine of
self-defense. The previous rigorous requirement that defendants
demonstrate the necessity of the killing was annihilated. In the
Wray decision the key issue was seen as mutuality-let the blows
and the bullets fall where they may. The Wray decision may well
have contributed to the high incidence of homicide in Mississippi
in the 1870's that Redfield noted.
As the old common law wilted in the hothouse legal environment of such cases as Grainger and Wray, a special and crucial
aspect of the traditional common law of homicide, the duty to retreat to the wall, also yielded to the combative culture of America
in general and the South in particular. The ancient English common
law doctrine held that it was the obligation of one who was attacked
and who was in reasonable fear of death or grievous bodily harm to
retreat "to the wall" before killing in self-defense. Thus, the law of
45. Ingersoll, supra note 43, at 260. Ingersoll, then Dean of Law at the University of
Tennessee, was a knowledgeable authority on Catron and the impact of his opinions as a
Tennessee Supreme Court judge. The encouragement to homicide resulting from Catron's
opinion in the Grainger case was not only unintentional but also ironic, for it contradicted
two other significant state supreme court opinions by Catron that discouraged violence and
disorder in antebellum Tennessee life. Catron's opinions in Smith v. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.)
228 (1829), and State v. Smith, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 272 (1829), limited the roles of dueling and
gambling. See also Gatell, John Catron, in 1 THE JuSTICEs OF THE UNTED STATES SUPREME
Cour, 1789-1969, at 737-49 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
46. 30 Miss. 673 (1856).
47. Schoolmaster Clarke S. Brown had expelled the younger brother of Jacob K. Wray
from the Pontotoc, Mississippi, male academy. The vengeful Wray began the fight in which
he killed Brown by accosting and striking him. When Brown fought back with a whipstock,
Wray slew Brown with a bowie knife.
48. 30 Miss. at 674.
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self-defense did not apply unless one observed the duty to retreat;
this was the English doctrine held by Blackstone and his predecessors in the common law tradition. But in the United States, in a
gradual legal revolution that began in the early nineteenth century,
a majority of states came to hold the opposite-that a person in a
place where he had a right to be could stand, defend himself, and
kill his assailant in self-defense, provided certain conditions freeing
him from fault were met. This is the stand-one's-ground rule, under
which there is no duty to retreat."
By the end of the nineteenth century, the stand-one's-ground
doctrine had become the rule in a majority of southern states, and
it also dominated the states of the central and western United
States. The traditional duty-to-retreat doctrine was mainly restricted to the eastern one-third of the nation and, in the South, to
the Carolinas and Alabama." As the Indiana Supreme Court noted
in 1877, the duty to retreat had been "greatly modified in this country [with] a much narrower application than formerly [because]
the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly
against the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee
when assailed . . . ."'I The United States Supreme Court gave its

approval to the stand-one's-ground doctrine in 1895 in Beard v.
United States,5 2 and the 1907 edition of a standard authority, Wharton's The Law of Homicide, stated that the duty to retreat was
"inapplicable to American conditions."53
49. Among many discussions of the waning of the legal duty to retreat and the waxing
of the stand-one's-ground doctrine is R. MORELAND, supra note 39, at 261-68. The classic
statement of the duty to retreat in the English common law tradition was made by Sir
Edward Coke, who held that some homicides were "no felony" and, thus, blameless. For
example: "A [is] assaulted by B, and they fight together, and before any mortal blow is
given, A giveth back until he cometh to a hedge, wall, or other strait, beyond which he cannot
pass, and then, in his own defense and for safeguard of his own life, killeth the other. . . ."
F. BAUM & J. BAUM, supra note 41, at 38 (quoting E. COKE, THE THiRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (1797)).
50. Beale, supra note 40, at 576 n.3.
51. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877).
52. 158 U.S. 550 (1895). Beard's conviction for homicide in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Arkansas was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground,
stated by Justice Harlan, that Beard had been entitled to stand his ground and had no duty
to retreat. Id. at 564.
53. F. WHARTON, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 355 (3d ed. F. Bowlby 1907). Wharton was
echoed by Moreland and the Baums in declaring that "there is probably no more mooted
element of self-defense than [the duty to] 'retreat' . . . ." See F. BAUM & J. BAUM, supra
note 41, at 38; R. MORELAND, supra note 39, at 261. In addition to authorities cited elsewhere
in these notes, the following commentators deal saliently with the erosion of the legal duty
to retreat in the United States. 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 733 (1941); 39 KY. L.J. 353 (1951); 20 KY.
L.J. 362 (1932). Important cases not cited elsewhere in these notes include McNamara v.
State, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960); State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318, 104 N.W. 971
(1905); State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 71 S.W. 148 (1902). The legal distinction between
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IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO SOUTHERN VIOLENCE
A. Justice Stone and the Alabama Supreme Court
The Graingerand Wray cases were straws in the wind, but the
erosion of the duty to retreat was a major trend. Yet, in one southern
state after the Civil War, this Americanization of the common law
of homicide met courageous rear-guard action by George Washington Stone and his colleagues on the supreme bench of Alabama.
Although Justices Robert C. Brickell, H. M. Somerville, William S.
Thorington, and other supreme court colleagues made their contributions in Alabama, the central figure was Stone. Stone, who was
born in 1811 and died at the age of eighty-three in 1894, was a
typical man of the New South. He reflected the mixture of deep
roots in the Old South with professional service to the New South.
Socially and politically, Stone shared the conservatism of many
New South figures. He was southern born and bred, a devout Presbyterian, a Confederate in Civil War allegiance, and a Grover Cleveland Democrat in politics. His judicial decisions advanced the progress of Alabama corporate interests in the New South era. A man
of upright dignity, Stone's portrait, taken late in his life, reveals a
thinly whiskered gentleman of steady mien and serene confidence.
Severely reserved on the bench and in large public gatherings, Stone
was yet sociable among his intimates. He loved to play his violinno doubt a welcome respite from his relentless pace of decisionwriting. Stone was proud of his physical vigor that sustained him
"excusable" and "justifiable" homicide has been controversial as well as complicated. This
distinction has been increasingly eroded in the United States, but among those who discuss
it are F. BAum & J. BAUM, supra note 41, at 6-23, and R. MORELAND, supra note 39, at 253-56.
Most authorities who write on the issue of the duty to retreat also are obliged to discuss
excusable and justifiable homicide.
One influential authority in regard to the deemphasis of the duty to retreat in the United
States was the British commentator, Sir Michael Foster, who in a 1762 treatise on aspects of
crown law (including homicide) noted that the victim of a felonious assault was not bound
to retreat before killing in self-defense. Foster's doctrine of stand-one's-ground in cases of
felonious assault was followed by a later British writer who was even more widely cited in
America. See 1 E. EAsT, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CRowN 271-72 (1803). The impact
of the Foster-East doctrine is seen as early as the Massachusetts case of Selfridge v. Lithgow,
2 Mass. 347 (1806). It also is reflected in the Ohio case of Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186
(1876), as well as in the writings of various commentators. One impassioned dissenter from
Foster's doctrine was Beale, who argued that Foster had misinterpreted Coke and in so doing
had mistakenly deemphasized the duty to retreat. Beale, supra note 40, at 573.
Another variant of the stand-one's-ground rule, the "true man" doctrine, appears in
many cases. See, e.g., Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876). This doctrine also goes back to
Foster. In Law of Self-Defense, the Baums have noted that under the impact of the American
crime wave of the 1960's and 1970's, the legal right to violent self-defense has been powerfully
increased. For example, the trend is present even in the two widely divergent states of heavily
urbanized New York and strongly rural Nebraska. New York had been a duty-to-retreat state
until about 1940. F. BAUM & J. BAUM, supra note 41, at 8-9, 57-59.
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through three marriages and more than a quarter of a century on
the highest bench of Alabama."
Stone's service on the Alabama Supreme Court was in two
spans. The first was from 1856 to 1865; the second, the much more
important of the two, was from 1876 to 1894. During the latter term
he served as Chief Justice from 1884 until his death in 1894. His
impact on Alabama law was great, to say the least, for he wrote
about one-sixth of the opinions issued by the Alabama Supreme
Court during its first seventy-five years (1819-1894) despite his
serving on the court for only twenty-seven years of the seventyfive year period. As noted, he was an indefatigable writer of judicial
opinions. Writing in 1910, Francis G. Caffey was of the opinion that
until then, Stone's total of 2449 opinions was unexceeded by any
"English or American judge of a court of last resort . . . ."65 Although Stone's legal and judicial career was moored firmly in the
pre-Civil War years, he was not a hide-bound traditionalist. He
could combine a deep reverence for the purity and elevation of the
morals of the "grand, colossal system""-the common law-with a
forward-looking and prophetic 1889 plea for procedural reform
in Alabama in which he paid tribute to England's substitution of
a new system of civil procedure for the "cumbrous machinery of
the common law."57
From 1876 to 1894 in his appellate opinions, George Washington Stone led a strongly principled courtroom campaign against
homicide in Alabama. These appellate cases heard by Stone and his
supreme court colleagues are rich in the social history of Alabama
violence in the New South period. The facts of the cases are full of
the mixture of meanness and tragedy that so deeply anguished both
Horace V. Redfield and George Washington Stone. Before discussing the thrust of Stone's homicide decisions, consider the following
example of the long forgotten but typical human catastrophes that
afflicted Alabama and the South. This episode is from Judge v.
State," an appeal heard by Stone and his high-court compeers. The
court reporter caught very well the dialect and flavor of the time:
54. Caffey, George Washington Stone, in 6 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 43,
at 165. See also Farmer, Stone, George Washington, in 18 DIcroNAnY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY

74 (1936).
55. Caffey, supra note 54, at 181-82.
56. Ex parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 268, 275 (1877).
57. Merchant, The HistoricalBackground of the ProceduralReform Movement in
Alabama, 9 AiA. L. REv. 284, 286 (1957) (quoting 12 PROCEEDINGS OF ALA. ST. B. Ass'N 108,

113 (1880)).
58. 58 Ala. 406 (1877).
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The testimony was, that the deceased was foreman of a plough squad on
the plantation of one Win. H. Locke, and it was the duty of deceased to report
any idleness or misconduct of the plough hands, and that defendant was one
of such squad, and a larger man than deceased; that deceased had been instructed by Mr. Locke to hurry up idle hands, and if they refused to report
them. About 11 o'clock on the morning of the killing, the hands had come out
of the field on account of rain, and when the rain had ceased, the defendant
and other hands were going to the lot for their mules. Defendant being a little
slow, deceased remarked to him, "Alex, go and get your mule," to which
defendant replied, "Ain't I gwine"; deceased replied, "if you are you are going
blamed slow," when defendant said, "if you want me to go faster, make me."
Deceased then remarked, "Alex, next time I speak to you and you answer me
that way, I'll knock your blamed mouth wide open." Defendant then looked
back at deceased, but said nothing. Deceased then said, "Alex, if you want a
difficulty you can get it right now," to which defendant replied, "if you want
one you can get it." Deceased then turned towards defendant and, having gone
a few paces in ordinary gait, put his right hand in his pocket, when defendant
went to the right, five or six steps from deceased, and snatching up a wagon
standard returned, and meeting the deceased struck him two licks on the left
arm, which the deceased had thrown up to keep off the blows-the right hand
of deceased hanging by his side. The defendant hit deceased a third time, on
the right shoulder, and a fourth time, on the head, when deceased fell towards
the defendant, who struck him a light blow on the back while he was down.
Deceased jumped up immediately. By this time two persons present caught
hold of defendant, standing between him and deceased. Deceased was standing still, when defendant jerked loose from those holding him, with the standard still in his hand, and stepped towards deceased and struck him on the
head, just above the ear, knocking him down-defendant having both hands
on the standard and striking with all his force. Deceased got up "looking
foolish," and picked up a knife which was lying on the ground shut up, and
opened it and started towards the defendant, when some one present remarked, "shut up your knife, you can't get to that man (the defendant) while
he has got that stick in his hand, he will kill you." Deceased then shut the
knife, put it in his pocket, and went into a house near by and ordered the hands
to go to ploughing. He then came out of the house, got on his horse and rode
towards Mr. Locke's house, about a mile off, where he died in a few hours from
compression of the brain, (as testified by physicians,) produced by a fracture
of the skull from the blow given by defendant.5'

Such was the senseless dispute between Wallace and Judge and
its fatal outcome-it was this frequent and inexcusable taking of life
that Stone opposed with all his judicial vigor. In an early case during his second term on the supreme court, Stone handed down an
opinion in which he enunciated the motive that would guide him in
future decisions"-his utter detestation of the popular belief that
killing in a mutual fight was not murder or manslaughter, a doctrine
deplorably upheld, Stone said angrily, by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in Ex parte Wray. The principles enunciated in Wray, Stone
maintained, which were widely held in society in Alabama as well
as in Mississippi, were "annually rushing scores, if not hundreds of
59. Id. at 407-08.
60. Ex parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 268, 274-77 (1877).
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our citizens into eternity, red with their own blood causelessly
shed."" Stone admonished:
Until courts and juries learn to place a proper estimate on the sacredness and
inestimable value of human life; learn that life is not to be taken to avenge an
insult, even though gross; learn that felonious homicide, even willful and deliberate murder, may [sic] be committed during a personal, nay, mutual rencontre; until juries learn that the crime of murder is not expunged from our
statute book, nor retained only for the friendless or humble, we may expect
the carnival of the manslayer to be prolonged . . . .62

Announcing these antihomicide sentiments was one thing; writing them effective by rulings and decisions on points of law was
another. Here the jurist, Stone, acted upon what the layman, Redfield, would note in his book 3 -the spurious plea of self-defense that
saved many killers from conviction before the bench. After 1876 the
main thrust of Stone's antihomicide opinions was to narrow the
grounds for and efficacy of the self-defense argument as a means to
legitimate a homicide. Finally, in the 1888 case of Cleveland v.
State," Stone summarized certain principles that he, on behalf of
his supreme court colleagues, had "often reiterated, as indispensable to the plea of self-defense.""
The manslayer must be free from fault, in bringing on, or provoking the difficulty. . . . He must be exposed to present, impending peril; that is, he must

be presently exposed to imminent danger of losing his life, or of suffering
grievous bodily harm, or must reasonably appear to be so [endangered. He
must have] no other reasonable mode of escape, without apparently increasing
the imminence of his peril."

In effect, Stone was laying down a three-part test for the plea of selfdefense. The test might be called the test of provocation, peril, and
escape. The defendant must not have provoked the difficulty; he
must have been exposed to present and impending peril, or he must
have reasonably thought that he was in such peril; and in line with
the aforementioned duty to retreat, safe escape must have been
impossible. There was nothing new in these principles. What was
significant, rather, was the way in which Stone tightly linked them
in a rigorously maintained barrier against illegitimate pleas of selfdefense.
The Cleveland case, which brought forth this reiteration of
61. Id. at 274.
62. Id. Although the Alabama reporter states that murder "may be committed during
a personal, nay, mutual rencontre," it is clear that Justice Stone intended the opinion to
read that murder "may not be committed during a personal, nay, mutual rencontre."
63. See generally H. REDPELD, supra note 6.
64. 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426 (1888).
65. Id. at 9, 5 So. at 430.
66. Id., 5 So. at 430-31.
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basic principles, was a bizarre one, and it may well have tried the
patience of Stone and his colleagues. The facts of the case arose
from the events of an early February 1888 night in Mobile. Ulysses
Cleveland entered into a drunken brawl with three others, and in
his inebriated condition in the darkness of the outdoor scene, killed
Glennon under the mistaken impression that he was defending himself against Tom Popham, whom he felt was bent on harming him
badly. Cleveland did not pass Stone's provocation-peril-escape test,
and the lower court's conviction of second-degree murder was upheld."7 In the Cleveland case Stone stated another highly conservative common law principle that was dying in America, but as applied by the Alabama Supreme Court, increased the difficulty of a
defendant gaining acquittal. According to this principle, the burden
of proving the necessity for taking life was on the defendant.1# According to Blackstone, "[i]n every charge of murder . . . all the

circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity, are to be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence
produced against him . . . .""

Three examples of Stone's application of the elements of the
provocation-peril-escape test will be cited. First, Johnson v. State70
illustrates the factor of provocation. In Birmingham early in the
evening of Friday, June 11, 1892, A. R. Johnson brutally shot and
fatally wounded an unarmed neighbor, John W. Kimbro, in front of
Kimbro's house. It all started over a hot quarrel between their two
wives. Mrs. Kimbro had accused Mrs. Johnson of sleeping with a
black man-servant. Mrs. Johnson objected, and in rebuttal, Kimbro
claimed that Mrs. Johnson had been unladylike in her rudeness to
him. Johnson called out Kimbro to talk about it; the words grew
angry; each man gave the other the lie. Kimbro struck the first blow
with his fist, and Johnson shot him down.7' He later claimed selfdefense. Justice Stone applied the test of provocation to the defendant's contention that Johnson was "reasonably free from fault in
provoking, or encouraging the difficulty . . . ."72 Stone strongly rejected this contention because he was impressed that Johnson was
67. Id. at 7-11, 5 So. at 429-31.
68. Id. at 9, 5 So. at 431. See also De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351, 358-63 (1882), Ex
parte Brown, 65 Ala. 446, 446-48 (1880). The common law doctrine that the burden of proof
in homicide cases lies on the defendant is discussed in F. BAUM & J. BAUM, supra note 41, at
4-5.
69. F. BAUM & J. BAUM, supra note 41, at 4.
70. 102 Ala. 1, 16 So. 99 (1893). In this case the prosecution was aided by Stone's
support of the lower court's admission of Kimbro's dying declaration. For the significance of
the dying declaration, see text accompanying note 80 infra.
71. 102 Ala. at 7, 16 So. at 101.
72. Id. at 19, 16 So. at 105.
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at fault for going armed to Kimbro's house and calling him out to
talk. Johnson flunked the test of provocation, and his conviction of
second-degree murder was affirmed.73
Second, Scales v. State7 4 illustrates the factor of peril. A quarrel
broke out between Robert Scales and James C. McCain in St. Clair
County. Scales provoked the dispute, and he later went to McCain's
house with a concealed gun in his possession. McCain struck the
first blow with his fist; Scales shot and fatally wounded his adversary.75 Scales claimed self-defense, and when convicted of firstdegree murder in the lower court, appealed to the supreme court.
Stone applied the peril test and opined that McCain's fisticuff was
not sufficient to cause Scales to fear "impending 'grievous bodily
harm . . .

.'

"7 Hence, Scales' use of the fatal weapon was inexcus-

7
able, and the verdict of the lower court was upheld?.
The final element of the provocation-peril-escape test is the
duty to retreat and the obligation to escape from the scene, if safely
possible, before killing. Among many examples, the escape factor
was crucial in Judge v. State.7 Alexander Judge, the killer of Robert
Wallace, easily could have escaped from the scene of the cotton field
dispute with Wallace. Thus, Judge gained no sympathy from Stone,
who in his opinion spoke strongly in favor of

the old, sound, and much disregarded doctrine, that no man stands excused
for taking human life, if, with safety to his own person, he could have avoided
or retired from the combat .

.

.. It is to be regretted that this salutary rule is

not universally observed by juries, without reference to the social standing of
the prisoner. Its observance would exert a wholesome restraint on unbridled
and would, in the end, preserve to the commonwealth
passion and lawlessness,
7
many valuable lives. '

Still, the provocation-peril-escape test was only a part of
Stone's judicial war against Alabama's plague of homicide. While
rigorous in applying the provocation-peril-escape test, Stone also
seems to have been liberal in allowing the admission into evidence
of the "dying declaration" of the deceased, a description of the
crime that was a crucial factor in the prosecution's case against the
killer." Moreover, Stone was strongly opposed to what he termed
the "most pernicious practice of wearing weapons, with formed de73.
74.
Karr v.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
96 Ala. 69, 11 So. 121 (1892). Other cases demonstrate the peril factor. See, e.g.,
State, 100 Ala. 4, 14 So. 851 (1893).
96 Ala. at 74, 11 So. at 123.
Id. at 78, 11 So. at 125.
Id.
58 Ala. 406 (1877).
Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added).
A leading example of Stone's liberality is Ingram v. State, 67 Ala. 67 (1880).
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sign to use them on an insufficient emergency." 8' He also condemned the illegal concealment of such weapons."
B. The Quest for Impartialityin Alabama Justice
George Washington Stone and his supreme court colleagues
rigorously applied the provocation-peril-escape test in homicide
cases, but did they do so impartially? When whites killed blacks and
claimed self-defense as their reason for doing so, did the Stone court
tip the scales of justice in favor of white defendants? Two cases83
heavily charged with racial tension reveal that the Alabama Supreme Court, headed by Stone, applied the law without prejudice
to blacks. In these cases Stone's opinions strongly backed similarly
unprejudiced rulings by the trial judges in the lower courts. One
case was urban; the other was rural. Both featured controverted
evidence that easily could have been exploited by prejudiced judges
and juries in favor of the white defendants and against the black
victims. In neither case did this happen.
The urban case arose in Mobile in the 1880's. Martin Dolan, a
white man, killed his black tenant, Robert Winbush, with a shotgun." The white man was small and wiry, while his black victim was
a robust 175 pounds. Neither had a good reputation, and there had
been bad feelings between them. In a quarrel over the payment of
Winbush's rent, death threats had been exchanged. Also in dispute
was a heavy hand chain possessed by Winbush but claimed by
Dolan. Winbush finally went to Dolan's house, where they angrily
renewed their quarrel over the chain. The two parted with a heated
exchange of racial epithets. The white witnesses said that Winbush
went up the street to get a gun with which to kill Dolan, but the
black witnesses said otherwise. In any case, Winbush strode up the
street with chain in hand. Almost immediately Dolan, now armed
with a shotgun, followed Winbush and called to him to stop. Winbush then ran back toward Dolan, brandishing the chain and asking
Dolan what he was going to do with the firearm. Dolan's brother
then appeared, but failed in his attempt to persuade Dolan to withdraw. Meanwhile, Winbush kept advancing toward Dolan. When he
was within a few feet of Dolan, the latter shot him down. In a few
minutes Winbush was dead."
81. Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26, 35 (1877).
82. Ramsey v. State, 91 Ala. 29, 8 So. 568 (1890); Street v. State, 67 Ala. 87 (1880).
83. Dolan v. State, 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707 (1886); Ingram v. State, 67 Ala. 67 (1880).
84. Dolan v. State, 81 Ala. 11, 13, 1 So. 707, 708 (1886). Neither the facts of the case
nor Stone's opinion state when Dolan killed Winbush, but it was probably in 1885 or 1886,
since the supreme court heard Dolan v. State in its December 1886 term.
85. Id. at 12-13, 1 So. at 708.
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The trial of Dolan was racially polarized. All the prosecution's
witnesses were black; all the defense's witnesses were white. Dolan's
attorney contended that the prosecution's witnesses could not be
believed because they were black. Judge 0. J. Semmes scotched this
with his charge to the jury that in a case of compelling evidence, "it
is just as much the duty of a jury to convict a white man of the
murder of a colored man" 6 as the reverse. Judge Semmes emphasized to the jury that the color of a witness was immaterial; the only
issue was his credibility. In his charge to the jury, Judge Semmes
called for and obtained the conviction of Dolan for manslaughter.
Dolan appealed the conviction to the Alabama Supreme Court, and
Stone wrote the court's opinion upholding the lower court's conviction. For his supreme court colleagues, Stone's opinion affirmed
Judge Semmes' doctrine of impartial justice for blacks and strictly
applied the provocation-peril-escape test to Dolan's plea that he
had killed Winbush in self-defense. Scorning Dolan for his inexcusable failure to obey the duty to retreat, a point stressed by Judge
Semmes, Stone rejected Dolan's claim of self-defense. Stone upheld
Semmes' contention that because Dolan pursued Winbush with a
gun, Winbush and not Dolan was on the defensive. In applying the
peril test, Stone found that when Dolan went after Winbush, Dolan
was in no "imminent, impending, present" danger.17 Instead, the
peril, if any, was only "prospective" or "in the near future.", Thus,
in this case, marked by the trial judge's, jury's, and supreme court's
lack of racial prejudice, Stone's opinion was every bit as strict in its
scrutiny of the plea of self-defense as in cases of killings involving
only whites.
While the racial overtones of the Dolan case were deep, neither
the white killer nor the black victim had high standing in their
communities. The case of Ingram v. State,89 however, had greater
social significance, for it involved the social and economic supremacy of whites in the midst of a heavily black rural community. The
scene of the homicide was the little town of Childersburg, Alabama,
and the time was half an hour before sundown on the afternoon of
October 19, 1876. That day Thomas Ingram, a white man who had
previously killed a man in Georgia, had been guarding with a shotgun five blacks who had been charged in the afternoon justice court
with stealing cotton from Green, a storekeeper and planter of the
community. As the shadows lengthened, a black, Jack Coleman, sat
86. Id. at 14, 1 So. at 709.
87. Id. at 17, 1 So. at 712.
88. Id. at 18, 1 So. at 712.

89. 67 Ala. 67 (1880).
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with others on the porch of a house on the town square where the
justice court during its sitting that afternoon had heard the charges
against the five blacks."
Still carrying his shotgun, Ingram went by the porch and asked
for a word with Coleman. Witnesses saw the two of them start across
the square toward Green's store. A quarrel broke out; Coleman, the
black, in a matter of seconds or minutes was killed by Ingram, the
white." At the trial a white witness for Ingram testified that Coleman had pulled a three-inch knife on Ingram. As Ingram and Coleman halted, face to face, the witness continued, Ingram said to
Coleman, "do not cut me with that knife." 2 With the shotgun on
his shoulder, Ingram then warned Coleman, "if you cut me, or try
to cut me, I will shoot you."" Again, the witness testified that Ingram said "do not cut me," and as he said it, he stepped backward
slightly. The trial record recounted that Ingram "took his gun off
his shoulder, held the muzzle of it close to Coleman's breast and
fired, the shot taking effect on the left side of his breast"" and
making a huge wound. Coleman "fell immediately, and died about
a week afterwards." 5 Immediately after the shooting, as the blood
oozed from Coleman lying on the ground, a witness, Joseph H.
Keith, asked him what had happened. Coleman replied that he
knew that he was going to die, that he had not drawn his knife on
Ingram, and that Ingram "had shot him for nothing.""
At this time a race riot might well have occurred, for shortly
after the shooting fifteen or twenty blacks "marched in procession
in Childersburg, and made demonstrations of hostility." 7 But violence did not occur, perhaps because black manpower and white
firepower came to a stand off. In due course, Ingram was indicted
and tried for murder before Judge L. F. Box in the Talladega Circuit
Court. Ingram, however, was convicted of the lesser charge of manslaughter, and he appealed this conviction to the Alabama Supreme
Court. Stone wrote the opinion upholding the conviction.
Ingram was represented by John T. Heflin, who tried to exploit
the emotion of racial prejudice by emphasizing the hostility of the
blacks marching immediately after the shooting. Stone swept this
argument aside as irrelevant." Moreover, Stone gave an important
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 68-70.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id. at 71.
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edge to the prosecution by upholding the admission into evidence
of Coleman's "dying declaration," although it was made a week
before his death. On this point, Stone maintained that the gaping
wound in Coleman's chest was serious enough to make credible
Coleman's feeling that he was going to die on the spot." Of course,
Heflin's main contention for his client was that he shot in selfdefense because Coleman pulled an open knife on him. Stone
strictly applied his tests of peril and escape and found that Ingram
failed both tests. Stone declared that
[hiuman life is not taken with impunity, if the slayer . . . failed to retire.
when he could have done so without endangering his life . . . . When the

accused stepped back, so as to afford him space to level his gun, he had placed
the deceased at such a disadvantage . . . that any attempt at aggression by

the latter could have been easily averted."?

Thus, Stone dryly concluded, "[o]ne having a loaded gun pointed
at another, who is not advancing, can not be in present imminent
peril of life or limb, even though that other have an open knife in
his hand.""o' Presumably, Stone and his high court colleagues were
believers in white supremacy, but in the Ingram and Dolan cases
there was no double standard of justice for whites at the expense of
blacks.
C. A Contrast in Judicial Responsiveness: Unpunished Homicide
in Texas
In striking contrast to the conservative, restrictive attitude of
Justice Stone and the Alabama Supreme Court toward the legitimation of homicide was, and is, the permissive legal attitude represented by the extremely violent state of Texas, a state with an
explosive mixture of deep southern and frontier western characteristics.102 In Texas the Americanization of the common law of homicide
reached its apex. More than any other state, South or North, Texas
altered the old common law tradition of the criminal law.
Comprised of a web of statutes, penal codes, and state supreme
court decisions, the Texas system has changed little since the adoption of the first penal code in 1856. This code embodied the Old
South tolerance of taking lives in personal disputes. The present
99. Id.
100. Id. at 72.
101. Id. at 73.
102. On the history of Texas violence, see R. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL
STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 236-99 (1975); W. HOLLON, FRONTIER VIOLENcE: ANOTHER LOOK 36-55 (1974); C. SONNICHSEN, I'LL DIE BEFORE I'LL RUN: THE STORY OF
THE GREAT FEUDS OF TEXAs (1962). On Texas violence in our own time, among many works,
see J. BAINBRIDGE, THE SUPER-AMERICANs 238-58 (1962); H. LUNDSGAARDE, supra note 9.
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penal code of Texas is essentially the same as the 1856 Code. As the
foreword to the current code candidly admits, the code "retains too
much of the frontier in its treatment of firearms [and] still permits
too much force on too many occasions."IO3 Thus, the Texas penal
code, which has shown remarkable continuity since antebellum
times, provides "private citizens with wide discretionary powers to
kill their fellow citizens legally and with impunity."' Far from
being restricted the rights of killers are explicitly favored. A comparative study found that the Texas penal code significantly widened
the common law doctrine of justifiable homicide.' Nor was the
liberal code the end of the expansive trend in Texas law, for the
study also noted that the interpretations of the Texas Supreme
Court further liberalized what the already tolerant penal code allowed.0 '
True to pattern, the duty-to-retreat doctrine has fared especially badly in the Lone Star state. In his 1885 opinion in Bell v.
State,"we Judge Samuel A. Willson of the highest court of Texas
forthrightly acknowledged that although the tradition of "[t]he
common law required the assailed party to 'retreat to the wall,' " the
Texas penal code's abolition of the duty to retreat was "a statutory
innovation upon the common law . . . ."" The facts of the Bell

case reveal in human terms the impact of this Texas innovation in
the law of self-defense. Shortly after midnight in Waco on March
28, 1883, Bill Bell, driver of a horse-drawn cab, and his drunken
passenger, A. T. Moreland, entered into a fare-paying dispute over
the miniscule sum of twenty-five cents. Moreland was both the
bigger man and the aggressor, but he had the misfortune of insulting
the smaller man's honor. The imbroglio turned physical when Moreland attacked Bell with his fists. In defending himself with a knife
against Moreland's blows, Bell fatally wounded Moreland.' The
trial court convicted Bell of second-degree murder, but this verdict
was reversed upon appeal to the court of last resort. Speaking for
the court, Judge Willson held that the lower court judge had erred
by failing to instruct the jury that according to Texas law, Bell had
no duty to retreat before killing in self-defense. Thus, the court held
that Bell's action was one of "justifiable homicide."110 In a duty-to103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

H. LUNDSGAARDE, supra note 9, at 149.
Id. at 162.
13 Sw. L.J. 508, 515, 518 (1959).
Id. at 519-20.
17 Tex. Crim. 538 (1885).
Id. at 550-51. Judge Willson cited article 573 of the Texas penal code.
Id. at 539-45.
Id. at 553. Other late nineteenth-century cases in which the highest Texas court
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retreat state such as Alabama, Bell's conviction for homicide would
not have been reversed.
Because no state has exceeded Texas in its espousal of the
stand-one's-ground doctrine, it is often referred to as the "Texas
rule.""' In a throwback to the nineteenth century, the duty to retreat is mentioned in a recent Alabama case,112 but as noted earlier,
the majority of states have turned against it. Nevertheless, it is
significant that among all these states the penal code of Texas is the
only one that has explicitly repudiated the duty to retreat. A person
defending his person or property, said the Texas law until 1973, "is
not bound to retreat in order to avoid the necessity of killing his
assailant." 13 The duty-to-retreat problem is directly relevant to the
incidence of homicide in the South. Henry P. Lundsgaarde in his
searching study of 268 of Houston's 1969 homicides tells us that the
absence of a retreat provision in Texas law added significantly to
the carnage in the Space City, since in case after case, "both killers
and victims could easily have de-escalated the seriousness of the
situation by retreat.""
Probably no state goes further than Texas in allowing a person
to kill in defense of property, including property of "slight value
[that] . . . could ordinarily be given up momentarily with only

little, if any, loss of face." 115 This is in stark contrast to the law in
Alabama, where the supreme court in Storey v. State held that
"[i]t would be shocking to . . . have it proclaimed . . . that one

may, in the broad daylight, commit a willful homicide in order to
for criminal cases, the court of appeals, applied the no-duty-to-retreat rule included Baltrip
v. State, 30 Tex. Crim. 545, 549 (1891); Nalley v. State, 30 Tex. Crim. 456, 459 (1891); Ball
v. State, 29 Tex. Crim. 107, 126 (1890); White v. State, 23 Tex. Crim. 154, 163 (1887); Parker
v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. 105, 109 (1886); Arto v. State, 19 Tex. Crim. 126, 135 (1885); Williams
v. State, 14 Tex. Crim. 102, 112-13 (1883). In all these cases as in the Bell case, the court of
appeals held that the trial judge was at fault in not instructing the jury that there was no
duty to retreat in Texas. In these decisions, the court in effect warned lower court judges that
they ran the risk of reversal on appeal if they failed to instruct the jury that there was no
duty to retreat. Alabama was exactly the opposite. Stone and his supreme court colleagues
held the threat of reversal over the heads of trial judges who did not instruct juries that there
was a duty to retreat.
111. R. MoRELAND, supra note 39, at 262-63. The term "Texas rule" may go back to
Holmes' opinion in Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). Brown dealt with a
Texas killing, and in his opinion Holmes discussed, approvingly, the Texas stand-one'sground doctrine. This case is discussed in text accompanying notes 119-23 infra.
112. Vander Wielen v. State, 47 Ala. App. 108, 251 So. 2d 240 (1971); Beale, supra note
40, at 576 (citing Alabama's nineteenth-century status as a duty-to-retreat state).
113. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 15, art. 1224 (Vernon 1911) (emphasis added), repealed
by TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 9.32 (Vernon 1973).
114. H. LUNDSGAARDE, supra note 9, at 164.
115. Stumberg, Defense of Person and Property Under Texas Criminal Law, 21 TEx.
L. REv. 17, 32 (1943).
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prevent the larceny of an ear of corn." 16 With so many legal provisions for justifiable homicide in Texas, Lundsgaarde found that a
majority of the 268 killers studied qualified for consideration by the
courts as persons who had justifiably committed homicide. Consequently, although ninety percent of the 1969 Houston killers were
apprehended, less than half of them suffered any penalty at law."'
Both G. W. Stumberg and Lundsgaarde found an implicit vigilantism in the Texas situation. So latitudinous are the Texas laws
"pertaining to justifiable homicide [that the need] . . . for police,
judges, juries, and any form of third party authority [is practically
eliminated] as long as one can convincingly establish that the killing was a response to a threat against person or property.""'
Carried to its extreme in Texas, the Americanization of the
common law of homicide ultimately gained the blessing of the
United States Supreme Court's most talented phrase-maker, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in Brown v. United States." Appropriately enough, the case originated in Texas. Because the homicide
in question occurred on United States property, the case was tried
in the federal district court rather than in a state court. Ill will
between two Texans, Hermes and Brown, had existed for some time.
Brown was supervising construction at the site of a post office when
Hermes approached him with a knife. When Hermes lunged at
Brown with the knife, Brown, who had come armed to his construction job because he feared an attack by Hermes, fired four shots at
his assailant and killed him. Convicted of second-degree murder in
the federal district court, Brown appealed unsuccessfully to the circuit court. He also appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which issued its opinion in 1921. The issue was whether Brown was
under a duty to retreat before killing Hermes in self-defense. The
lower courts held that Brown was under such an obligation, and
failing to meet it, was guilty of murder. Speaking for the majority
of the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes took a contrary view. In so
doing, he discussed briefly but incisively the duty to retreat in legal
history. Justice Holmes stopped short of a complete endorsement of
the doctrine of stand-one's-ground, but he tilted his opinion heavily
in that direction. Referring to the gradual ascendancy of the standone's-ground rule under American conditions, Holmes wrote that
[tihe law has grown . . . in the direction of rules consistent with human
nature. . . . Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes
116.
117.
118.
119.

Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 341 (1882).
H. LUNDSGAARDE, supra note 9, at 145.
Id. at 164. See generally Stumberg, supra note 115.
256 U.S. 335 (1921).
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that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his
assailant he may stand his ground and that if he kills him he has not exceeded
the bounds of lawful self-defense.'2

This was capped with a typical Holmes apothegm: "Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."'2 '
Brown had been in precisely such a position-facing an uplifted
knife. "Therefore," declared Holmes, "in this Court, at least, it is
not a condition of immunity that one in that situation should pause
to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible
to fly with safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill
him."122 Before announcing the Court's decision to reverse Brown's
conviction, Holmes cited approvingly the law of Texas in favor of
the stand-one's-ground doctrine. 2 1
V.

CoNCLUsIoN

Both inside and outside the South, was the law a cause of the
high incidence of homicide, or was it an effect? It was probably more
effect than cause, for despite the antihomicide rigor of its supreme
court, on the whole the incidence of killing in Alabama seems to
have been no lower than elsewhere in the South. Thus, the conservative Alabama court apparently failed to stem not only the legal
trend of the Americanization of the common law of homicide but
also the trend of blood-letting in Alabama. In one way this is not
surprising, for after all, the great majority of homicide cases never
went before the supreme court. Some of the lower court judges,
especially LeRoy F. Box of Talladega, 0. J. Semmes of Mobile, and
James B. Head of Walker County, seem to have applied the law
strictly according to Stone and their other mentors on the highest
court, but on the other hand, there is evidence of tension between
the restrictive stance of Stone's court and the permissive tendency
of community opinion. In one homicide trial a defense counsel had
the audacity to declare to the jury that it was "above [the] court
and the Supreme Court in [its] right to decide [the] case."' The
defense attorney was duly reprimanded from the bench, but the
whiff of defiance lingered in the air.
Legal rules such as the doctrine of retreat and its obverse, the
stand-one's-ground doctrine, are in significant cultural and moral
relation to the South's historical national leadership in homicide.
120. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id. at 343-44. Their reasons not given, Justices Pitney and Clarke dissented from
this decision.
124.

Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 84-85, 11 So. 250, 251 (1892).
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While many courts were lining up behind the "Texas rule" of standone's-ground, there was one outspoken and distinguished legal
scholar who would have none of it. Joseph H. Beale, writing in the
Harvard Law Review in 1903, denounced the stand-one's-ground
doctrine as a "brutal doctrine" whose judicial ethics were the
"ethics of the duelist," values supported chiefly in the South and
the West where community mores made it "abhorrent to the courts
to require one . . . assailed to seek dishonor in flight.",,

Beale had no doubt about the general theoretical validity of the
duty to retreat. "No killing can be justified, upon any ground,"
unless absolutely necessary, said Beale, and killing is "not necessary
. . . when the assailed can defend himself by the peaceful though

often distasteful method of withdrawing to a place of safety." 2 '
Beale was forthright in confronting the unwritten code of behavior
that so often justified killing in the South. In "the case of a killing
to avoid a stain on one's honor," wrote Beale, "[a] really honorable
man . . . would perhaps always regret the apparent cowardice of a
retreat, but he would regret ten times more . . . the thought that

he had the blood of a fellow-being on his hands."'1 The identical
sentiment was expressed by an Alabama jurist who declared that in
the legal doctrine of self-defense, as maintained in the courts of
Alabama, there was "no balm or protection . . . provided for

wounded pride or honor in declining combat, or sense of shame in
being denounced as cowardly. Such thoughts are [nothing] compared with the inestimable right to live." 28
In Texas the impact of the formal law, structured to support the
person who killed in defense of self or property, reinforced rather
than restrained the homicidal tendency. Texans, headed by members of the bench and bar and by state legislators, reflected persisting social mores by extending into the realm of the formal law the
unwritten code that approved of violence. Conversely, Stone in Alabama, following the dictates of the old English common law whose
"purity and elevation" of "morals" he deeply revered, 2 sought in
his opinions to extend the authority of the formal law into the
homicide-ridden society of Alabama. In so doing, Stone and his
125. Beale, supra note 40, at 577.
126. Id. at 580.
127. Id. at 581. In this article Beale, who during his career served briefly as Dean of
Law at the University of Chicago and for a long time as Professor of Law at Harvard,
obviously did not hesitate to speak his mind strongly. In another article of the same year,
Homicide in Self-Defense, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1903), Beale confined himself largely to a
discussion of case law and held the statement of his own views to a minimum.
128. Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 85, 11 So. 250, 252 (1892).
129. Ex parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 268, 275 (1877).
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supreme court colleagues wished to narrow the scope of the unwritten code of behavior that so often sanctioned the taking of lives in
personal disputes. In this regard, Stone was not only an example to
his fellow citizens but also an eloquent spokesman for the deeper
values of peace and civility that underlay the superstructure of violence in southern life. The Americanization of the common law of
homicide against which Stone and his Alabama Supreme Court
colleagues fought was not confined to the South; the West underwent the process as well. 30 Yet, it seems fair to conclude that aspects of our national history, such as frontier violence, racial conflict, and individual slayings in defense of personal honor that have
contributed to the sometimes legal legitimation of homicide in
America, have converged with greatest impact in the South. Thus,
this exploration of homicide in legal and historical perspective suggests that southern violence has been both a regional problem and
a salient contributor to the national nemesis of violence.
130. In regard to the process of the Americanization of the common law, W. E. NELSON,
AMEICANZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACr OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETS

Soclery, 1760-1830 (1975), deals primarily with the civil law. There is no comparable booklength study of the criminal law.

